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The increasing energy challenges worldwide are forcing researchers to explore
ways for energy systems that work more efficiently on their own and with each
other. This thesis develops an integrated electricity market equilibrium model
(EMEM) as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). In particular, we first
develop an equilibrium model to study an electricity market consisting of coal
producers, electricity generation firms, natural gas producers, natural gas marketers,
natural gas pipeline owners, natural gas consumers and electricity consumers. The
equilibrium model not only captures a decentralized optimization for each player
but considers the interaction amongst players. Second, we formulate the equilibrium
model as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and conduct computational
studies and sensitivity analyses to shed lights on energy policy making. Numerical
results show that the proposed integrated equilibrium model can effectively govern
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With the changing climate and resource scarcity today, the world’s energy
system is on the verge of a major transformation. Energy systems can refer to
Electric power system (supply, transmission and consumption of electric power),
thermodynamic system (a physics concept for analysis of thermal energy exchange)
and bioenergetics system (metabolic processes for converting energy in living
organisms). This thesis deals with electricity markets and components involved in it.
Various technologies are building blocks for the transition to a sustainable
energy future. Sustainable energy not only focuses on renewable energy sources such
as hydroelectricity, solar energy, wind energy, wave power, geothermal energy,
bio-energy, tidal power but also technologies designed to improve energy efficiency.
There are various ways in which energy efficiency can be improved; one such way is
to integrate various forms of energy in order to achieve the maximum utilization of
all the sources involved in integration.
In this thesis, our focus on electric energy market is to improve the efficiency
of the overall system. The latter is multi-faceted in nature. For example, electricity
can be generated by multiple sources such as coal, natural gas, wind, solar, etc.
Within each generation type, there are multiple market players such as coal
producers, coal-fired power generation companies and electric power grid owners for
the coal-firing generation. Similarly, nature gas producers, pipeline owners, pipeline
operators and power grid owners are key players in the gas-firing generation. In the
literature, many researchers have studied optimization models for one player or one
subsystem. For example, Kolstad and Abbey [3] examine the effects of market
behavior on international steam coal trade while Thompson et al. [4] study natural
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gas storage optimization problems. However, few papers deal with integration of
coal and natural subsystems. In our view, only when these subsystems are studied
jointly can we accurately assess the overall electricity market and its behavior.
Therefore, the research in this thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by
integrating all the components (i.e., subsystems) involved in the electricity market
and study the economic equilibrium for this integrated electricity market system.
To further motivate the development of our proposed economic equilibrium
model for the electricity market, in the last decade, the electricity industry has
experienced significant changes towards deregulation and competition with the aim
of improving economic efficiency (see e.g. [1]). When markets are deregulated,
pricing of commodities and services should be purely based on market supply and
demand. Therefore, an economic equilibrium model and its resulting
market-clearing prices can be useful for policy makers to assess the overall system
efficiency. Indeed, along the same line of motivation, many have studied equilibrium
models in the energy research. For example, Kazempour and Hopkins [5] analyze
the impact of large-scale wind power integration on the electricity market
equilibrium. As another example, Fuller et al. [6] propose a mathematical model to
determine the optimal energy storage systems (ESS) operation as well as the market
clearing prices. Our proposed economic equilibrium model is guided by the same
principle aiming to offer insights for a deregulated electricity market.
In particular, the proposed economic equilibrium model for electricity
markets considers seven types of market players: electricity generation firms that
own both coal and gas fired generators, natural gas producers, natural gas pipeline
operators, natural gas marketers, and coal mine owner, and finally electricity
consumers and natural gas consumers. All generation and services are subject to
fixed and deterministic capacities, while consumer demands for electricity are
elastic. We develop mathematical models that each player (or subsystem) wishes to
optimize and then integrate these optimized subsystems into an equilibrium model
by using market-clearing conditions to represent the interaction between pairs of
players. In other words, the market equilibrium model optimizes each of the
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individual components (i.e. electricity sector, natural gas sector and coal sector)
and ensures that the market clearing conditions are satisfied whenever the
individual components interact with each other. It is important to note that, as by
products, the market-clearing prices for the equilibrium model offer guidelines for
commodity pricing such as electricity price at demand region and coal prices for
different regions in the electricity market.
The contribution of this thesis is two-fold. First, we develop an equilibrium
model to study an electricity market consisting of coal producers, electricity
generation firms, natural gas producers, natural gas marketers, natural gas pipeline
owners, natural gas consumers and electricity consumers. The equilibrium model
not only captures a decentralized optimization for each player but considers the
interaction amongst players. Second, we formulate the equilibrium model as a
mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and conduct various sensitivity analyses to
shed lights on energy policy making.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature on the electricity market, coal market, natural gas market and equilibrium
models in electricity market. Chapter 3 formulates the mathematical models for
each of the components involved in the electricity market. Chapter 4 presents the
computational experiments and their results and conclusions and future research are




In this chapter, we review the body of research in the operations research
literature that is closely related to our research in this thesis. This review is divided
into five parts on: electricity market optimization, natural gas market optimization,
coal market optimization, integrated energy systems and finally the applications of
mixed complementarity problems, respectively.
2.1 Optimization Models for Electricity Markets
Optimization of electricity markets is widely studied by many researchers
with various objectives or constraints. For example, Hobbs [7] considers imperfect
competition among electricity producers. This paper focuses on developing a linear
complementarity model of the Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO
power markets (A POOLCO is a privatized power exchange that operates auctions,
hosts spot market sales and generally functions as a privately owned market place
for energy sales in the wholesale marketplace). The model is formulated as mixed
linear complementarity problem. The model considers two types of players, i.e.,
electricity producers and grid owners, and its solutions are essentially the
imperfectly competitive equilibria. Similarly, Cardell et al. [15] present a work on
market power and strategic interaction in electricity markets. This paper presents a
model where a firm no longer exercises market power by restricting its own
production. This model constrains the electrical network where generator exercises
market power by increasing its production in order to block transmission. The
players in the model are Cournot firms and a collection of competitive fringe
participants. This model illustrates the possible strategic interactions between the
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players. Furthermore, Ramos et al. [16] model the competitive behavior of electric
firms by incorporating equilibrium constraints. These constraints provide
characterization of the first order optimality conditions of strategic companies. The
objective of this approach is to maximize profit while meeting the equilibrium
constraints.
One other stream of research in the electricity market optimization studies
the market power of various players. For example, Kahn et al. [17] model the
electric markets for estimating the price or cost margins; however, they conclude
that the model may not be able to tell whether a firm or set of firms can succeed in
manipulating market prices. Borenstein et al. [19] provide an an empirical analysis
of the potential for market power in Californias electricity industry. The model in
this paper shows the two most important factors in determining the extent and
severity of market power. The factors are available hydroelectric production and the
elasticity of demand. The model indicates that there is potential for significant
market power during high demand hours (where elastic demand comes into picture).
Finally, Helman et al. [18] present a strategic pricing model in bilateral and Poolco
electricity markets by using Nash-Cournot approach and use the U.S. eastern
interconnection as a case study. This paper has two specific models a Nash-Cournot
framework and represents transmission constraints by a linearized DC network. The
formulation in this model helps in computation for larger markets while
guaranteeing the existence of unique price equilibria. As mentioned previously, the
above literature mainly focuses on electricity markets optimization, but not-
integrated energy system as a whole. The major difference between these literatures
and the current thesis is that we study an integrated energy equilibrium model that
includes coal market, electricity market, natural gas market and elastic demand.
2.2 Optimization Models for Natural Gas Markets
Natural gas markets optimization is not new in the literature but they have
generally focused on either optimization of gas operations or computation of market
equilibrium prices, flows and quantities. We review several papers in this area.
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Some works present natural gas market equilibrium model that involves natural gas
market alone. For instance, Gabriel et al. [8] discuss mixed complementarity based
equilibrium model of natural gas markets. This paper presents a natural gas market
equilibrium model that has producers, storage reservoir operators, peak gas
operators, pipeline operators, marketers and consumers. The equilibrium model is
an instance of a mixed nonlinear complementarity problem for natural gas market
(NCP). The NCP formulation is derived from considering the Karush-Kuhn- Tucker
optimality conditions of the optimization problems faced by these participants. The
natural gas equilibrium model is validated by considering nine market participants,
three seasons and using four scenarios. Similarly, Zhuang et al. [20] discuss a
large-scale complementarity model of the North American natural gas market. This
paper analyses the natural gas market using a linear complementarity equilibrium
model. The players considered are producers, storage and peak gas operators, third
party makers and end user sectors. The model is validated based on National
Petroleum Council scenarios. Few researches also study natural gas optimization
models with main focus on cost minimization. Avery et al. [21] develop an
optimization model for purchase, storage and transmission contracts for natural gas
utilities. The model minimizes cost while satisfying regulatory agencies and presents
a decision support system for natural gas utilities to plan operations. The model
considers wellhead, consumers, transport and storage as its players.
Additionally, there are few works that consider optimization techniques to
meet natural gas demand. Zheng et al. [22] model the natural gas markets for
meeting the demand. The players considered are natural gas producers,
transportation network, and market (consumers). Optimization techniques are
widely used to meet the demand for natural gas and have yielded a lot of promising
results. The pipeline network for natural gas markets is also widely studied. There
are optimization models for dimensioning of pipeline networks. De Wolf et al. [23]
present optimal dimensioning of pipe networks with applications to gas transmission
networks. While all these works deal either with natural gas market in a
decentralized fashion or develop an equilibrium model for natural gas market alone,
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our thesis presents an equilibrium model for electricity markets and its players as an
integrated system.
2.3 Optimization Models for Coal Markets
Coal was the first fossil fuel used for heat and power. Coal consumption
declined as oil and natural gas replaced coal in heating, electric engines, steam
engines and motors. Throughout the long period in decline of coal consumption,
electric utilities expanded their use of coal enormously.
There are quite a lot of models that discuss minimization of costs for fuel
inputs, forecasts of coal prices, coal production and consumption. There are
programming models for coal markets that analyze the demand for coal. Labys et
al. [25] present a quadratic programming model of the Appalachian steam coal
market. The authors attempt to analyze the Appalachian steam coal market using a
programming approach. The destinations of Appalachian coals have been
determined on the basis for the demand for steam coal created by major utility
companies. This model determines the extent to which Appalachian coal can meet
eastern US steam coal demands by minimizing costs of fuel inputs. Energy
Information Administration [EIA] developed a mathematical model for computer
implementation of the National Coal Model [26]. This report contains the objectives
used in the development of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) Coal
market Module. The conceptual and methodological approach is used for the
development of this system. The CMM provides annual forecast of prices,
production, and consumption of coal for the NEMS. The CMM has two submodules
Coal Production Submodule (CPS) and Coal Distribution Submodule (CDS). The
CPS provides supply inputs that are integrated by the CDS to satisfy demands for
coal received from demand models. The CDS forecasts annual world coal trade flows
from major supply to major demand regions and provides annual forecasts of U.S
coal exports for input into NEMS. This work completely focuses on forecasts of
prices, production and consumption of COAL only.
There are few works that formulates an equilibrium model for coal markets.
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Haftendorn et al. [10] models to assess international coal markets until 2030. This
paper presents an equilibrium model of international market for steam coal. The
players considered in this model are producers and exporters. This equilibrium
model is formulated in the complementarity format. This model is tested by using a
base case scenario and suggestions for alternative scenarios. Franziska et al [28]
model and analyse the International Steam Coal trade. This paper presents the
analysis of prices and trade flows for steam coal in the international market. This is
done by simulating the market for a couple of years using the complementarity
modeling technique. The paper presents two models 1) quality based model for coal
and 2) a model that incorporates energy values. The conclusion of this paper is that
an energy-based model is more superior than a quality based model.
Complementarity format discussed in these two works Haftendorn et al. [10] and
Franziska Holz et al [28] exactly fits into a part of the work done for this thesis.
Furthermore, there are transportation models in the literature review for coal
markets. LeBlanc [27] formulates a transportation Model for the US Coal Industry.
This work presents a general economic model that minimizes the cost of coal
shipments in the United States. The economic model described is a linear
programming model. This model assumes coal demand and sulfur dioxide emission
regulations. The results of the model indicate significant differences in flows and
shadow prices under varied assumptions. As Demand plays a vital role in any
supply chain, there are literature reviews that model for coal demand. Labys et al.
[25] and Maggi et al. [29] has their work on development and perspectives on supply
and demand in the global hard coal market. They discuss the root causes for the
extreme price developments of coal and provides insights on changing supply and
demand structure within the seaborne hard coal market. Maggi et al. [29] build
analytical methods for the development and perspectives on supply and demand in
the global hard core market. These are few literature reviews that model coal
market by itself for various reasons mentioned but none of them consider modelling
two or more different systems/entities and solve for equilibrium.
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2.4 Optimization Models for Integrated Energy Systems
Integrated energy systems play a vital role in efficient energy planning and
sustainable development. There are very few works in the literature review that
consider modelling the energy system as a whole. Quelhas et al. [9] present a
multi-period generalized network model of the U.S. integrated energy system. It is a
multi-period generalized network flow model of the integrated energy system in the
United States. The players considered in the model are coal and natural gas
suppliers to the electric load centers. The mathematical model is developed by
connecting the electricity demand nodes and fuel supply via a transportation
network. The model incorporates production, storage and transportation of coal,
natural gas and electricity in one mathematical framework. The model is solved for
the most efficient allocation of quantities and corresponding prices. The objective of
the proposed model is to minimize the total costs which include fuel production
cost, fuel transportation costs, fuel storage costs, electricity generation costs and
electricity transmission costs. It also provides numerical results which describes the
application of proposed model. There are few literature reviews that consider
modelling the integrated energy systems for economic studies. Gil et al. [30] develop
an integrated energy transportation networks for analysis of economic efficiency and
network interdependencies. This paper presents an integrated mathematical
framework for coal, gas, water, and electricity production and transportation. The
model named as the National Electric Energy System (NEES) is formulated using a
network flow optimization model. It is modelled fundamentally by balancing energy
at various nodes such as production nodes, storage nodes, generation nodes and
electric transmission nodes. The objective function is set to minimize the total cost
in the entire framework. The solution for this model is an algorithm anchored in the
network simplex method. Also, McCalley et al. [31] model an integrated energy
system for determining nodal prices. This is a generalized network flow model for
integrated energy systems. This model is used to analyze the economic
interdependencies of energy systems. This model comprises multiple entities such as
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electric network and fuel supply and delivery systems. The model is solved using an
optimization algorithm that also provides nodal prices as a byproduct. These nodal
prices provide a way to analyze the economic interdependencies between the various
fuel networks and the electric network. (Nodal pricing is defined as a method of
determining prices in which market clearing prices are calculated for a number of
locations on the transmission grid called as nodes).
However, all the above researches are trying to model the integrated energy
systems but none of them considers the competition among participants. Hence, in
this thesis we intend to develop an integrated economic equilibrium model for
electricity markets that consider electricity market (production and transmission),
elastic demand of electricity by consumers, natural gas market (upstream natural
gas producers, midstream natural gas pipeline owners, downstream natural gas
marketers) and coal market (coal producers) along with market clearing conditions
that serve as binding bridge among these players.
2.5 Formulation of Mixed Complementarity Problems
In our thesis, optimization models are developed for each of the players
involved in the integrated energy system. All these players are interconnected to
each other by market clearing conditions. These individual optimization models are
modelled into a single equilibrium model by formulating into a mixed
complementarity problem. There are few works in the literature review that use a
similar approach for modelling. Few such literatures are Cottle et al. [33] explain
the formulation of linear complementarity problem. Similarly, Gabriel et al. [37]
present complementarity modeling in Energy markets. This book presents clear
picture of the modeling advantages of complementarity problems vs optimization
and standard models. Modelling for equilibrium constraints is seen in some
literature reviews, Luo et al. [35] model mathematical programs with equilibrium
constraints. This paper mentions the method for binding various players using
equilibrium constraints which is used as an example in our thesis. Dirks et al. [34]
has a collection of nonlinear mixed complementarity problems. This paper explains
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the formulation for nonlinear mixed complementarity problems which is used for
nonlinear cost functions in my thesis.
After developing the mathematical model for the integrated energy system as
a whole, it is tested for numerical results and validation. General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) is one such mathematical modelling language used by
many researchers. Ferris et al. [32] describe complementarity problems in GAMS
and the PATH solver. This paper presents the method to find a solution for a
square system of nonlinear equations by converting them into complementarity
problem. This paper explains the methodology for solving such problems in GAMS
and provides details about the PATH solver for finding the solution. There are also
works on extensions of GAMS for complementarity problems arising in applied
economic analysis. All of the above cited literature has been used to implement the
developed integrated energy equilibrium model into GAMS and obtain numerical
results.
2.6 The choice of production cost functions for electricity, coal, natural gas and
elastic demand
The production cost functions for coal, natural gas and electricity have been
widely cited in many literature reviews. Few such researches have been studied
during the course of our thesis. Bhagwat et al. [38] develop a report on cost of
underground coal mining in Illinois. This report has been used as reference for coal
production cost function. They presents a linear production cost function for coal
that depend on various factors such as annual production, age of mines, labor
productivity, mine development cost, coal cleaning level. On considering the typical
values for all these factors, a constant value has been determined. The final coal
transportation cost used in our thesis has turned out to be a linear cost function.
Gabriel et al. [8] develop a mixed complementarity-based equilibrium model
of natural gas markets. This paper has been used a reference for production cost
function of electricity and natural gas. The electricity production cost function is a
linear function and is used as such. The natural gas cost function is modified
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according to the units considered in my thesis.
For elastic demand, there are quite a lot of literature reviews major them
being traffic models. Dafermos [39] presents a multimodal network equilibrium
problem with elastic demand. It defines the concepts of user-optimality and
equilibrium. The algorithm proceeds by iteration, each step of which amounts to
computing the equilibrium pattern for a single modal linear traffic equilibrium
problem with elastic demands. Arnott et al. [40] develop a structural model of
peak-period congestion. This paper considers the modeling of road congestion
subject to peak-load demand. The model treats elastic (i.e., price-sensitive) demand
and examines some economic implications of the structural approach. There are
very few works that consider elastic demand in energy markets and are mainly seen
in bidding strategies for electricity markets Wang et al. [41]. In this paper they
propose an evolutionary imperfect information game approach to analyze bidding
strategies in electricity markets with price-elastic demand. All of the above cited
literature have been used as a basis for elastic demand function used in our thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ELECTRICITY MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In this chapter, we discuss the mathematical model behind EMEM. This
chapter is divided into two parts on: notations and assumptions, and mathematical
model for integrated energy system.
3.1 Notations and Assumptions
As mentioned previously, we consider an electricity market consisting of seven
elements: power generation firms that own both coal-firing and gas-firing
generators, coal producers, natural gas producers, natural gas pipeline owners,
natural gas marketers, natural gas consumers and electricity consumers. The
relationships between these elements are as follows. First, electricity and natural gas
consumers are represented by electricity demand nodes (i) and natural gas demand
regions (j), respectively. Second, each natural gas producer n belongs to a natural
gas supply region w through a mapping function τ(n) = w, and each coal producer
m belongs to a coal supply region v through a mapping function τ(m) = v. Third,
each generation unit u belongs to a generation firm f through a mapping function
o(u) = f . Additionally, unit u has a designated generation technology h(u) to
indicate the coal type if coal-firing or if it is gas-firing and a designated transmission
network through a mapping function θ(u). Finally, we consider two uses k = 1, 2 of
natural gas: generating electricity or others including industrial, commercial and
residential. They have separate demands at each natural gas demand region j.
These elements each has associated attributes. A generation unit u is associated
with its unique heat rate (MMBTU/MWh), heat content (MMBTU/short ton),
non-fuel related marginal costs ($/MWh), production cost ($/MWh), and capacity
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(MW). Furthermore, natural gas producer and coal producer each has production
capacity. For natural gas pipeline owner, each pipeline l has its origin, destination
regions as well as capacity (MCF). Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration for a
small integrated system and Table 1 summarizes the sets, indices and parameters
for these components used in our model.
i = 1, . . . , I electricity demand nodes
j = 1, . . . , J natural gas demand regions
n = 1, . . . , N natural gas producers
w = 1, . . . ,W natural gas producer locations
τ(n) mapping of natural gas producer n
to its location (i.e., τ(n) = w, w = 1, . . . ,W )
ω(n) mapping of natural gas producer n to its supply region w
(i.e., ω(n) = w, w = 1, . . . ,W )
m = 1, . . . ,M coal mine owners
v = 1, . . . , V coal mine locations
τ(m) mapping of coal mine owner m to its location
(i.e., τ(m) = v, v = 1, . . . , V )
τ(u) mapping of coal unit u to its coal supply region
(i.e., τ(u) = v, v = 1, . . . , V )
f = 1, . . . , F power generation firms, with each firm possibly owning several units
u = 1, . . . , U generation units
o(u) mapping of a generation unit u to its owner f (i.e., o(u) = f)
h(u) electricity generation technology of unit u (coal, natural gas);
k = 1, . . . ,K fuel consumption sectors (electricity, industrial, commercial, residential)
o(k) mapping of sector k (eg. o(k) = 1 means that k is electricity sector)
a = 1, . . . , A natural gas marketers
l = 1, . . . , L natural gas pipelines
o(l), d(l) the origin and destination of pipeline l
HRu heat rate of generation unit u [MMBTU/MWh]
HCc heat content of coal type c [MMBTU/short ton]
Cu(·) non-fuel related marginal costs for generation unit u [$/MWh]
Cn(·) production cost for natural gas producer n [$/MCF]
X̄u capacity of generation unit u [MW]
Ḡn natural gas production upper bound for producer n [MCF]
L̄l pipeline l capacity [MCF]
Z̄m capacity of coal mine m [short ton]
t time periods
Ht number of hours in period t
Dt number of days in period t
TABLE 1
Description of parameters in EMEM
The equilibrium model is driven by the maximization of the total utility of
electricity and natural gas consumers. It will determine, while respecting capacity
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constraints at various player sites, the production levels for electricity generation
units, natural gas producers and coal producers, and the flows from coal producers
to generation units, from natural gas producers to pipelines then to generation
units, from natural gas producers to pipelines then to natural gas demand regions,
and from generation units to electricity demand regions. Table 2 summarizes the
variables representing these quantities and some associated function used in the
mathematical model.
xut electricity generated by unit u in time t [MW]
suit electricity sales by unit u to demand region i in time t [MW]
gnt natural gas produced by producer n in time t [MCF/period]
zmt coal produced by owner m in time t [short ton/period]
qawjkt natural gas bought by marketer a from supply region w
to ship to region j, sector k in time t [MCF/period]
flt natural gas flow through pipeline l
pgwt upstream (wellhead) natural gas prices at region w in time t [$ / MCF]
pgjkt downstream natural gas prices paid by consumers
in region j, sector k in time t [$/MMBTU]
P gjkt(·) inverse demand function of natural gas in region j, sector k in time t
plt natural gas transportation rates for pipeline l in time t [$/MCF]
pcvt coal prices for region v coal in time t [$/short ton]
psvo(u) shipping cost of transporting coal from coal mine region v
to the region of generation unit u [$/short ton]
peit electricity price at demand region i [$/MWh]
P eit(·) inverse demand function of electricity at node i in time t [$/MWh]
deit electricity demand at region i in time t [MW]
TABLE 2
Variables and Functions in EMEM
3.2 Mathematical model for Integrated Energy System
In this section, we examine each players optimization problem first, and then
present the integrated equilibrium model. First, optimization problem for
generation firm f ′s is discussed. Firm f objective function is defined as




itsuit represents the revenue of f
generated by total sales of electricity by u to node i at t. Cu(Htxut) is the cost for
generation of electricity for u. These two terms are summed over those generation
units u that belong to firm f . Cost incurred due to natural gas is represented by
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pgτ(u)EtHtHRuxut and is summed over natural gas fired generation units. Cost for
purchasing coal is defined as pch(u)t(HRu/HCh(u))xutHt and cost for shipping coal is
defined as psvo(u)(HRu/HCh(u))xutHt. Both of these terms are summed over coal
fired generation units u that belong to firm f . Hence, profit for firm f is defined as
revenue minus sum of all costs. The constraint suit = xut means that electricity
generated by u at t is equal to sales of electricity by u to i at t summed over all
demand nodes i.























suit = xut, ∀t, ∀u : O(u) = f (λut) (2)
suit, xut ≥ 0,
Consumer’s utility optimization problem is defined as follows. The objective








P e(µit)dµit is the inverse demand function integrated over
electricity demand deit. It is the price at which customers are willing to pay for








it is the actual price for electricity demanded.
















s.t. deit ≥ 0,
Supply must always be equal to demand and following equation represents it. It is
the market clearing condition between electricity generators and consumers.




suit, ∀i, t · · · peit (4)
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represents revenue generated by coal producer m by selling zmt shortton of coal at
price pcτ(m)t. Cost for production of coal is represented as Cm(zmt). The constraint
zmt less than or equal to Z̄m says that coal production is limited to a certain
capacity.








s.t. zmt ≤ Z̄m, (γmt) (6)
zmt ≥ 0,
Total coal produced by all producers m must be utilized for generation of electricity.
The mathematical form for this market clearing condition is defined as follows.





(HRu/HCh(u))xutHt, ∀v, t (pcvt) (7)
Natural gas producer optimization problem is discussed as follows. Like coal and
electricity players, natural gas also has similar objective function. The term∑
tDtp
g
w(n)tgnt represents the revenue for producer n generated by selling natural
gas at a price of gnt. The production cost is defined as
∑
tDtCn(gnt). Natural gas
producer n is allowed to produce up to certain capacity Ḡn.










s.t. gnt ≤ Ḡn, (δnt) (9)
gnt ≥ 0,
Natural gas produced by all the producers n that belong to region w must be equal
to the amount of natural gas bought by marketers a from supply region w to ship to
regions j, sectors k in time t. This market clearing condition is mathematically
defined as follows.
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qawjkt, ∀w, t (pgwt) (10)
Natural gas pipeline operator l maximization problem depends on flow through
pipeline l and natural gas transportation rates for pipeline l in time t. The flow
through pipeline l (flt) is restricted with an upper bound capacity of Ll.







s.t. flt ≤ Ll, ∀t (αlt) (12)
flt ≥ 0,
Market clearing condition for midstream pipeline market is merely flow conservation
principle. Flow through pipeline l at time t must be equal to natural gas bought by
marketers a from supply regions w to ship to regions j, sectors k in time t.
Mathematically, it can be represented as follows.






qao(l)d(l)kt ∀l, t (plt) (13)










w qawjkt) represents revenue
generated by selling natural gas to consumers. Cost for buying natural gas from



















k qao(l)d(l)kt). Hence, maximization problem for
marketer a is defined as follows.
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s.t. qawjkt ≥ 0,
Market clearing condition for downstream natural gas is similar to coal market
clearing condition, i.e. Total natural gas produced must be utilised by both electric
and non-electric sectors. For k = electric sector, 30% of natural gas produced must
be fully utilized for production of electricity. For k = non - electric sector, 70% of
natural gas must be utilized by non-electric sector. Mathematical form for this is
defined as follows.



















qawjkt, ∀j, t, k = non− elec sector (pgjkt)
(15)
Individual optimization problems for coal, electricity and natural gas markets
are integrated into equilibrium model by using market clearing conditions. This
model is presented as mixed complementarity problem (MCP) by using Karush
Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions and Lagrangian Equations. Lf (x, s;λ) represents
Lagrangian Equation for electricity markets. ∂L
f
∂suit
is the first order derivative of
Lagrangian Equation w.r.t positive variable suit. Similarly,
∂Lf
∂xut
is the first order
derivative w.r.t positive variable xut. Likewise, L
c(d), Ln(g; δ) , Ll(f ;α), La(q) and
Lm(z; γ) are Lagrangian Equations for consumer’s utility, natural gas producers,
natural gas pipeline owners, natural gas marketers and coal producers respectively.
The first order derivatives of all Lagrangian Equations w.r.t positive variables form
































































|u:o(u)=f,h(u)6=coal,h(u)=gas = 0 =⇒
∂Cu(Ht · xut)
∂(Ht · xut)




















|u:o(u)=f = 0 =⇒ −P e(deit) + peit = (≥)0
(19)














= 0 =⇒ −Dtpgwt +Dt
∂Cn(gnt)
∂gnt
+ δnt = (≥)0
(20)





































































= 0 =⇒ −pcτ(m)t +
∂Cm(zmt)
∂zmt
+ γmt = (≥)0 (23)
21
Variables suit xuit d
e
it gnt flt qawjkt zmt λut γmt δnt αlt










Constraints (4) (7) (10) (13) (15)
Complementarity positive variables: xut ≥ 0, suit ≥ 0, deit ≥ 0,gnt ≥ 0,flt ≥ 0
qawjkt ≥ 0, zmt ≥ 0, γmt ≥ 0, δnt ≥ 0, αlt ≥ 0
free variable(λut) matches with equality constraints
Table shown above lists the relationship between constraints and variables in MCP.
For example, suit is tied to Equation 16, p
e
it shadow price for electricity and is tied
to Equation 4. Likewise all the variables that are related to their respective
constraints are briefed in this table.
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In this chapter we present the numerical results for EMEM model. This
chapter is divided into five parts on: parameters and functions setup, EMEM
without natural gas, EMEM with natural gas,EMEM with natural gas and
non-electric sector, sensitivity analysis on EMEM.
4.1 Discussions on Parameter and Functions setup
We evaluate the proposed equilibrium model in the MCP format through
simulation using the PATH solver in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System).
In this section we discuss parameters and functions used in the model. Table 3
shows heat rate and heat content of coal for generation units u. Heat content for
generation units u4 and u5 is not specified since they are natural gas fired units.
Table 4 shows the shipping cost of transporting coal from coal mine region v to the









Heat rate of u and heat content of coal
Coal producers are limited to certain capacity of producing coal at any given







Shipping prices of coal
various parts of the U.S. Using this report, coal producer m1 is limited to a capacity
of 100,000 short ton/t and coal producer m2 is limited to a capacity of 120,000 short
ton/t. Similarly, capacities for pipelines l1 and l2 are set to be 2,740 MCF/day and
1,860 MCF/day respectively [14]. The Number of hours in a given time period t is
set around a month. Table 5 shows number of hours and number of days in time t.





Number of hours and days in period t
There are several important functions in the proposed model. First, P ejt(·) is
inverse demand function of electricity at node j in time t [$/MWh] and is set as
P ejt(·) = co − c1deit (co = 60, c1 = 0.1). Second, Cu(·) is non-fuel related marginal
costs for generation unit u [$/MWh] and is set as Cu(·) = 0.0002xut in reference with
Gabriel et al. [8]. Third, Cm(·) is production cost for coal producer m [$/shorttons]
and is set as Cm(·) = 31zmt in reference with Bhagwat et al. [38]. The cost per ton
of clean coal as defined in the report is Cm(·) = 44.22− (1.9085× 10−6)x1
−0.19906x2 − (6.3166× 10−3)x3 + (6.4903× 10−2)x4 + 0.75955x5 where x1 = annual
production (tons per year), x2 = age of mine (years), x3 = labor productivity (tons
per worker per year), x4 = mine development cost (dollars per ton annual
production), x5 = coal cleaning level. On considering the typical values for x2, x3,
x4 and x5 from the graphs as 12, 2500, 30 and 3 respectively, the final constant
value turned out to be 31.02. This results in the final production cost per unit to be
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Cm(·) = 31− (1.9085× 10−6)(annual production). Hence, the final total monthly
cost is set to be Cm(·) = 31(monthly production) −(1.9085× 10−6)(12)(monthly
production)2. In order to ignore non-convexity nature of the production cost
function, it is considered as linear function, Cm(·) = 31(monthly production).
Fourth, Cn(·) is the production cost for natural gas producer n [$/MCF] is set to be
Cn(·) = 0.005gnt +0.000003g2nt in reference with Gabriel et al. [8]. Although our
numerical experiments use MCF/day in the natural gas production, this production
cost is validated and produced similar results as in Gabriel et al. [8].
4.2 Results for Energy Market Equilibrium Model (EMEM) without Natural Gas
The mixed complementarity problem (MCP) that has been developed using
KKT conditions is numerically tested using parameters and functions as described
in Section 4.1. This section deals with the equilibrium model that has coal and
electricity as players. The numerical example that is considered for testing this
model has two electricity generation firms f1, f2, three electricity generation units
u1, u2, two coal mine regions v1, v2 and two coal producers m1,m2. Figure 2 shows
the schematic diagram that describes the interconnection between players. For
instance, generation unit u1 and generation unit u2 belong to electricity generation
firm f1. Similarly, u1 and u2 are served by coal producer m2 through coal mine
region v1. In these tables, it has to be noted that suffix CE means the model with
coal and electricity at equilibrium. There are other suffixes to be introduced in later
sections for other modelling scenarios.
Table 6 shows electricity sales by generation unit u to electricity demand
region i in time t. Generation units u1 and u2 belong to generation firm f1 and
receives its coal from coal producer m2. The model chooses u2 and not u1 for
generation of electricity for firm f1. This is because u2 is more efficient than u1
(efficiency of generation unit is inversely proportional to the ratio of heat rates and
heat contents). From Table 3 it can be seen that the ratio of HRu(MMBTU/MWh)
to HCh(u)(MMBTU/shortton) for generation unit u1 is 0.4634 and for generation
unit u2 is 0.5251. Generation unit u3 produces electricity irrespective of its
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COAL PRODUCER M2 COAL PRODUCER M1
COAL MINE REGION V1 COAL MINE REGION V2
GENERATION UNIT U1 GENERATION UNIT U2 GENERATION UNIT U3
GENERATION FIRM F1 GENERATION FIRM F2
Figure 2. Coal generation units and electricity generation firms
efficiency (since it is the only generation unit for firm f2). Also, it can be seen that
sales of electricity by generation unit u1 to demand node i1 at time t1 is 185
Megawatts and that of unit u1 to node i at time t2 is 196 Megawatts. It varies with
time because generation of electricity is inversely proportional to number of hours in
each time period. Table 5 shows that there are 700 hours in t1 and 660 hours in t2.
The demand nodes i1, i2 and i3 are all identical and hence receive same amount of
electricity at give time time t from generation unit u.
The equilibrium model shows that coal producers m1 and m2 produce coal to
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u i t suitCE(MW) u i t suitCE(MW)
1 1 1 0 2 2 1 185
1 1 2 0 2 2 2 196
1 1 3 0 2 2 3 215
1 2 1 0 3 1 1 113
1 2 2 0 3 1 2 121
1 2 3 0 3 1 3 132
2 1 1 185 3 2 1 113
2 1 2 196 3 2 2 120
2 1 3 215 3 2 3 132
TABLE 6










Electricity demand for EMEM: with CE
their fullest capacities i.e. m1 produces 100,000 [short ton /t] and m2 produces
120,000 [short ton /t], as discussed previously. Table 7 shows elastic demand
[Megawatts] for electricity consumer nodes i1 and i2 at time periods t1,t2 and t3.
The total amount of electricity generated by both firms f1 and f2 at a given time t
is equally distributed among consumer nodes i (since consumer nodes are all
identical).
Table 8 shows results for shadow price of electricity peitCE($/MWh). It can
be seen that the price of electricity for consumer node i1 at time t1 is $30.13/MWh
and for consumer node i2 at t1 is also $30.13/MWh. This is because both the
consumer nodes are served with same amount of electricity at given time period as
discussed earlier. The price of electricity at time period t3 is least when compared to
other time periods because there is more supply of electricity during time t3 (supply





















Coal price for EMEM: with CE
price of coal as pcvtCE($/Shortton). The shadow prices of coal for coal mine region
v1 at all times is greater than shadow prices of coal mine region v2. Recall from
Figure 2 that coal producer m1 belongs to region v2 with a maximum capacity of
100,000(Shortton/t) and coal producer m2 belongs to region v1 with a maximum
capacity of 120,000(Shortton/t). In other words, region with less capacity (v1) has
greater shadow price for coal when compared to region with more capacity. In this
numerical example it varies with times t1, t2 and t3 for region v1 such as
$62.02/Shortton, $58.12/Shortton and $51.28/Shorton respectively because of
different number of hours during each time-period. Similar explanation holds for
shadow price of coal for coal mine region v2.
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4.3 Results for Energy Market Equilibrium Model (EMEM) with Natural Gas
Figure 3 shows the schematic diagram of all the players involved when natural
gas market is added to the existing model in Figure 2 . Natural gas players added to
the baseline model are: two natural gas producers w1, w2 (identical), two pipelines
l1, l2, two marketers a1, a2(identical) and two consumer nodes j1, j2 are added to the
previous model. The results of this extended model are discussed in this section.
Figure 3. Electricity Market for EMEM: CNE
Before further examining the computational results, note that suffix “CE”
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means equilibrium model with coal and electricity while “CNE” means equilibrium
model with coal, natural gas and electricity. The equilibrium model has used all the
available capacity of coal for each of the coal producers, i.e. coal produced by coal
producer m1 is 100,0000 shortton/t at all the times and coal produced by coal
producer m2 is 120,0000 shortton/t at all times. Note that the additional natural
gas fired units only causes total electricity demand to increase, but doesn’t cause
less coal consumption. The elastic demand for electricity nodes i1 and i2 is shown
on Table 10. It can be seen that there is an increase in elastic demand after the
introduction of natural gas into the equilibrium model. An increase of 13.69
Megawatts of electricity demand can be observed (generation unit u4 produces 8.38
Megawatts and generation unit u5 produces 5.31 Megawatts).
Electricity demand
i t CE[Megawatts] CNE[Megawatts]
1 1 298 311.69
1 2 316 329.69
1 3 348 361.69
2 1 298 311.69
2 2 316 329.69
2 3 348 361.69
TABLE 10
Electricity demand for EMEM: CNE
Table 11 displays the results for sales of electricity by generation unit u to
demand node i during time t. As shown in the Table 11, there are electricity sales
from generation units u4 and u5 since they are natural gas fired units. Also sales
from generation unit u4 is greater than unit u5 . The efficiency of natural gas fired
unit depends on heat rate of the respective generation unit. Here, heat rate of NG
fired unit u4 is 7.0 (MMBTU/MWh) and for u5, it is 7.5 (MMBTU/MWh). In this
case, unit u5 is more efficient than unit u4 but still produces less amount of
electricity because of the fact that natural gas supplied to unit u4 is greater than
unit u5 (2,740 MCF/day for generation unit u4 and 1,860 MCF/day for generation
units u5). It can be observed from Table 11 that sales of electricity by generations
units u2 and u3 are different during various time periods. This is because, electricity
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fired units depend on number of hours in that time period and coal received by the
generation unit (Number of hours are set as different during each time period , u4
receives 120,0000 shortton/t and u5 receives 100,0000 shortton/t).
Figure 4. Flow of natural gas from producers to electric sector
Figure 4 shows natural gas flow from upstream (natural gas producers) to
downstream (natural gas consumers) via midstream (natural gas pipelines). There
are two identical natural gas producers considered in the model, thus both of them
produce 2,300 MCF/day at all times. Also, the capacity of pipelines is fully utilized.
Flow of natural gas through pipeline l1 is 2,740 MCF/day and through pipeline l2 is
1,860 MCF/day. It has to be noted that the flow of natural gas that leads to
consumer j1 is considered as pipeline l1 and the pipeline that leads to consumer j2 is
considered as pipeline l2. The amount of natural gas consumed by consumer j1 is
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685 MCF/day at all times and the amount of natural gas consumed by consumer j2
is 465 MCF/day at all times. This is governed by pipelines and their capacities that
connect consumers (685 times 4 = 2,740 (MCF/day) which is the pipeline capacity
of l = 1 and 465 times 4 = 1,860 (MCF/day) which is the pipeline capacity of
l = 1). This shows that the numerical results exactly match with the pipeline
capacities and accept flow principle.
Electricity Sales
u i t suitCE(MW) suitCNE(MW) u i t suitCE(MW) suitCNE(MW)
1 1 1 0 0 3 2 1 113 113
1 1 2 0 0 3 2 2 120 120
1 1 3 0 0 3 2 3 132 132
1 2 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 8.38
1 2 2 0 0 4 1 2 0 8.38
1 2 3 0 0 4 1 3 0 8.38
2 1 1 185 185 4 2 3 0 8.38
2 1 2 196 196 4 2 3 0 8.38
2 1 3 215 215 4 2 3 0 8.38
2 2 1 185 185 5 1 1 0 5.31
2 2 2 196 196 5 1 2 0 5.31
2 2 3 215 215 5 1 3 0 5.31
3 1 1 113 113 5 2 1 0 5.31
3 1 2 120 120 5 2 2 0 5.31
3 1 3 132 132 5 2 3 0 5.31
TABLE 11
Electricity sales for EMEM: CNE
Tables 12 and 13 display the results of shadow or dual prices of coal and
electricity respectively. Table 12 shows the price of electricity at equilibrium with
and without the addition of natural gas to the model. It can be seen that the price
of electricity is less when compared to the equilibrium model without natural gas.
This is because more electricity is produced than previous model due to the
presence of natural gas. In both cases, the price of electricity falls in the range of
[35,40] as reported by EIA 2009 [12]. Similarly, table 13 compares the price of coal
between the two models. Once again, the range of [38,40] is consistent with those
reported by EIA 2009 [12].
Table 14 shows the upstream (natural gas producer), midstream (pipeline
owner) and downstream (natural gas consumer) prices. The production price of
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Electricity price
i t peitCE($/MWh) p
e
itCNE($/MWh)
1 1 30.13 28.76
1 2 28.32 26.95
1 3 25.15 23.78
2 1 30.13 28.76
2 2 28.32 26.95
2 3 25.12 23.78
TABLE 12
Electricity price for EMEM: CNE
natural gas is considerably very less due to enormous amount of natural gas
production capacity (Natural gas capacity of both the producers is 100,000000
MCF/day). It can also be seen that the shadow price of natural gas transportation
cost and is fairly high (almost $4/MCF at all time periods) when compared to
natural gas production price because production is governed by natural gas pipeline
capacity in this equilibrium model. Also, the natural gas pipeline capacity is fully
utilized. The downstream natural gas price is the sum of natural gas production
price and natural gas transportation price at respective time periods (0.019 + 4.09
= $4.10/MCF). Interestingly, the range of [2.5,5.0] is consistent with those reported
by EIA 2009 [12].
Coal price
v t pcvtCE($/Shortton) p
c
vtCNE($/Shortton)
1 1 62.02 59.07
1 2 58.12 55.16
1 3 51.28 48.32
2 1 41.96 39.78
2 2 39.08 36.90
2 3 34.04 21.86
TABLE 13
Coal price for EMEM: CNE
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NG Region NG upstream price NG midstream price NG downstream price
w t pwtCNE($/MCF) pltCNE($/MCF) pwtCNE($/MCF)
1 1 0.019 4.09 4.1
1 2 0.019 3.83 3.85
1 3 0.019 3.37 3.39
2 1 0.019 3.81 3.83
2 2 0.019 3.57 3.59
2 3 0.019 3.15 3.17
TABLE 14
Natural gas prices for EMEM: CNE
4.4 Results for EMEM with non-electricity natural gas usage
The model discussed in this section is different from the one that has been
discussed in previous section 4.5 due to the presence of non-electric sector that
consumes natural gas. In addition to two natural gas producers w1, w2 (identical),
two pipelines l1, l2, two marketers a1, a2 (identical) and two consumer nodes j1, j2,
now there are two sectors added to the model k1, k2 where sector k1 belongs to
electric sector (meaning - natural gas that is supplied to sector k1 is exclusively used
for the production of electricity), sector k2 belongs to non-electric sector (e.g.,
consumers and businesses who use natural gas for heating). Figure 5 shows the
schematic representation of all the players with their interactions. We have
conducted preliminary testing for this framework using GAMS/PATH, which is not
discussed in this thesis.
Like previous section, “CE” refers to the results of model in section 4.c.1,
“CNE” refers to the results of model in Section 4.5 and “CNE-NonE” which means
coal, natural gas, electricity and non electric sector for natural gas refers to the
results of model in this section. Here, the results of all the three models are
compared with each other.
Table 15 displays the results for sales of electricity by generation unit u to
demand node i during time t. As shown in the Table 15, there are electricity sales
from generation units u2, u3, u4 and u5. The sales from generation unit u4 and
generation unit u5 are dropped (from 8.38 MW to 2.54 MW for unit 4 and 5.31 MW
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Figure 5. Natural gas market after the introduction of NonE sector
to 1.60 MW) in this case due to the addition of non-electric sector within natural
gas market. The quantity of natural gas that has to be supplied to non-electric
sector is governed by an additional constraint added in this model. This constraint
says that almost 70% of the total natural gas produced must be supplied to
non-electric sector. As a result, the amount of electricity generated by units u4 and
u5 is less than previous model and can be between two columns headed as
suitCNE(MW) and suitCNE-NonE(MW).
Like previous model described in Section 4.5 , this equilibrium model has also
used all the available capacity of coal for each of the coal producers i.e. coal
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produced by coal producer m1 is 100,0000 shortton/t at all the times and coal
produced by coal producer m2 is 120,0000 shortton/t at all times. Note that the
additional non-electric sector doesn’t cause less coal consumption but only produces
less electricity.
Electricity Sales (MW)
u i t suitCE suitCNE suitCNE-NonE u i t suitCE suitCNE suitCNE-NonE
1 1 1 0 0 0 3 2 1 113 113 113
1 1 2 0 0 0 3 2 2 120 120 120
1 1 3 0 0 0 3 2 3 132 132 132
1 2 1 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 8.38 2.54
1 2 2 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 8.38 2.54
1 2 3 0 0 0 4 1 3 0 8.38 2.54
2 1 1 185 185 185 4 2 3 0 8.38 2.54
2 1 2 196 196 196 4 2 3 0 8.38 2.54
2 1 3 215 215 215 4 2 3 0 8.38 2.54
2 2 1 185 185 185 5 1 1 0 5.31 1.60
2 2 2 196 196 196 5 1 2 0 5.31 1.60
2 2 3 215 215 215 5 1 3 0 5.31 1.60
3 1 1 113 113 113 5 2 1 0 5.31 1.60
3 1 2 120 120 120 5 2 2 0 5.31 1.60
3 1 3 132 132 132 5 2 3 0 5.31 1.60
TABLE 15
Electricity sales for EMEM: CNE-NonE
Electricity demand (MW)
i t CE[Megawatts] CNE[Megawatts] CNE-NonE[Megawatts]
1 1 298 311.69 302.85
1 2 316 329.69 320.95
1 3 348 361.69 352.63
2 1 298 311.69 302.85
2 2 316 329.69 320.95
2 3 348 361.69 352.63
TABLE 16
Electricity demand for EMEM: CNE-NonE
The elastic demand for electricity nodes i1 and i2 is shown on Table 17. It
can be seen that there is decrease in elastic demand after the introduction of
non-electric sector for consumption of natural gas into the equilibrium model.
Decrease of around 10 Megawatts of electricity demand can be observed for
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Electricity price





1 1 30.13 28.76 29.71
1 2 28.32 26.95 27.9
1 3 25.15 23.78 24.73
2 1 30.13 28.76 29.71
2 2 28.32 26.95 27.90
2 3 25.12 23.78 24.73
TABLE 17
Electricity price for EMEM: CNE-NonE
Coal price





1 1 62.02 59.07 61.13
1 2 58.12 55.16 57.22
1 3 51.28 48.32 50.38
2 1 41.96 39.78 41.30
2 2 39.08 36.90 38.42
2 3 34.04 21.86 33.37
TABLE 18
Coal price for EMEM: CNE-NonE
electricity demand node i1 at time t1 (generation unit u4 produces 2.54 Megawatts
(8.38 Megawatts earlier) and generation unit u5 produces 1.60 Megawatts (5.31
Megawatts earlier). This decrease in production of electricity due to consumption of
natural gas by non-electric sector is reflected in elastic demand.
Figure 6 shows natural gas flow from upstream (natural gas producers) to
downstream (natural gas consumers) via midstream (natural gas pipelines). There
Time W/O Non-Electric Sector With Non-Electric Sector
t w pwtCNE($/MCF) pwtCNE-NonE($/MCF) l pltCNE($/MCF) pltCNE-NonE($/MCF)
1 1 0.019 0.019 1 4.09 4.22
2 1 0.019 0.019 1 3.83 3.96
3 1 0.019 0.019 1 3.37 3.51
1 2 0.019 0.019 2 3.81 3.94
2 2 0.019 0.019 2 3.57 3.70
3 2 0.019 0.019 2 3.15 3.27
TABLE 19
Natural gas upstream and midstream prices for EMEM: CNE-NonE
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W/O Non-Electric Sector With Non-Electric Sector
j k t pjktCNE ($/MCF) pjktCNE-NonE($/MCF)
1 1 1 4.1 4.24
1 1 2 3.85 3.98
1 1 3 3.39 3.53
1 2 1 0 4.24
1 2 2 0 3.98
1 2 3 0 3.53
2 1 1 3.83 3.96
2 1 2 3.59 3.72
2 1 3 3.17 3.29
2 2 1 0 3.96
2 2 2 0 3.72
2 2 3 0 3.29
TABLE 20
Natural gas downstream prices for EMEM: CNE-NonE
are two identical natural gas producers considered in the model and can be seen
that both of them produce 2,300 MCF/day at all times. Also, the capacity of
pipelines is fully utilized. Flow of natural gas through pipeline l1 is 2,740 MCF/day
and through pipeline l2 is 1,860 MCF/day. Similar to previous Section 4.5, it has to
be noted that the flow of natural gas that leads to consumer j1 is considered as
pipeline l1 and the pipeline that leads to consumer j2 is considered as pipeline l2.
The amount of natural gas consumed by consumer j1 is 685 MCF/day at all times
and the amount of natural gas consumed by consumer j2 is 465 MCF/day at all
times. This is governed by pipelines and their capacities that connect consumers
(685× 4 = 2740 (MCF/day) which is the pipeline capacity of l1 and 465× 4 = 1860
(MCF/day) which is the pipeline capacity of l1). This shows that the numerical
results exactly match with the pipeline capacities and accept flow principle. As
there are two sectors introduced - k1 electric and k2 non-electric, amount5 of natural
gas received by consumer nodes j1 and j2 are distributed between k1 and k2. This
distribution is governed by a constraint that says almost 70% of natural gas has to
be sent to non-electric sector. Hence, amount of natural gas received by electric
sector k1 via natural gas consumer node j1 at time t1 is 207.5 (MCF/day) instead of
685 MCF/day. Remaining amount of natural gas is sent to non-electric sector k2,
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i.e. 477.5(MCF/day). Figure 6 and Table 21 show the distribution of natural gas
natural gas producer w to market a to consumer node j to sector k in time t. Note
that Figure 6 shows values only for w1, a1, j1, k1 and w1 ,a1, j1, k2 at time t1. Also
Table 21 shows values for marketer a1, marketer a2 is ignored as both the marketers
are identical and have exactly the same values.
W/O NE With Non-Electric W/O NE With Non-Electric
a w j k t qawjktCNE qawjktCNE with NE a w j k t qawjktCNE qawjktCNE with NE
1 1 1 1 1 685 207 1 2 1 1 1 685 207
1 1 1 1 2 685 207 1 2 1 1 2 685 207
1 1 1 1 3 685 207 1 2 1 1 3 685 207
1 1 1 2 1 0 477 1 2 1 2 1 0 477
1 1 1 2 2 0 477 1 2 1 2 2 0 477
1 1 1 2 3 0 477 1 2 1 2 3 0 477
1 1 2 1 1 465 140 1 2 2 1 1 465 140
1 1 2 1 2 465 140 1 2 2 1 2 465 140
1 1 2 1 3 465 140 1 2 2 1 3 465 140
1 1 2 2 1 0 324 1 2 2 2 1 0 324
1 1 2 2 2 0 324 1 2 2 2 2 0 324
1 1 2 2 3 0 324 1 2 2 2 3 0 324
TABLE 21
Natural gas sales by marketer for EMEM: CNE-NonE
Tables 17 and 18 display the results of shadow or dual prices of electricity
and coal respectively. Table 18 compares the price of coal at equilibrium with and
without the addition of non-electric sector to the model. It can be seen that the
price of coal is greater ($61.13/shortton for v1 at t1) when compared to the
equilibrium model without non-electric sector ($59.07/shortton) for v1 at t1) but less
than the model that has only coal and electricity at equilibrium ($62.02/shortton)
for v1 at t1). This is because shadow price directly depends on amount of electricity
demand that is being fulfilled. For example, Table 16 shows that the CE scenario
yields the least electricity demand for consumer node i1 at time t1 298 MW, followed
by 302 MW in the CNE-NonE scenario and then by 312 MW in the CNE scenario.
This is perfectly aligned with the order of the shadow price of coal, which is
$59.07/shortton in the CNE scenario followed by $61.13/shortton in the CNE-NonE
scenario and then by $62.02/shortton in the CE scenario. In all the three cases, the
price of coal is close to the range of [38,40] as reported by EIA 2009 [12]. Similarly,
table 17 compares the price of electricity between the three models and it can be
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seen that for consumer node i1 at time t1 the price is $30.13/MWh in CE scenario
followed by $28.76/MWh in the CNE scenario and $29.71/MWh in the CNE-NonE
scenario.It follows exactly same reasons as described for coal shadow price. Once
again, the range of [35,40] is consistent with those reported by EIA 2009 [12].
Table 19 shows the upstream (natural gas producer) and midstream (pipeline
owner). The production price of natural gas doesn’t change when compared to
previous model i.e. 0.0019 ($/MWh)) due to enormous amount of natural gas
production capacity (Natural gas capacity of both the producers is 100,000000
MCF/day). Table 20 shows the downstream price (natural gas marketer) of natural
gas at which marketer a sells to consumer node j for sectk during time t. This price
slightly increases ($4.224/MCF at j1, k1, t1) when compared to previous model
($4.1/MCF at j1, k1, t1) without non-electric sector because of change in amount of
natural gas that is being sent to non-electric sector. Interestingly, the range of
[2.5,5.0] is also consistent with those reported by EIA 2009 [12] in this model with
non-electric sector.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis for EMEM
In this section, sensitivity analysis is performed on EMEM model including
natural gas market and further its non-electric users. This analysis helps in better
understanding of affect of parameters on the developed model. We first vary natural
gas pipeline capacity and change it form 2,740 MCF/day and 1,860 MCF/day to
100,00000 MCF/day for both.
Efficiency of generation units depend on their heat rate and heat content.
Generation unit u4 costs $18.45/MWh and generation unit u5 costs $19.77/MWh.
Since u4 is more efficient than u5, natural gas is sent to unit u4. This results in the
production of electricity and sales by unit u4 as shown in Table 22. It has to be
recalled that generation units u1, u2 and u4 belong to firm f1 and u3, u5 belongs to
firm f2. Unit u2 doesn’t produce electricity in this case because unit u4 that belongs
to the same firm as unit u2 produces electricity using natural gas. Coal producer m1
uses its full capacity and produces 100,000 shortton/t as it supplies to generation
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Electricity Sales (MW)
u i t suitCNE-NonE suitCNE(SA pipeline cap) u i t suitCNE-NonE suitCNE(SA pipeline cap)
1 1 1 0 0 3 2 1 113 113
1 1 2 0 0 3 2 2 120 120
1 1 3 0 0 3 2 3 132 132
1 2 1 0 0 4 1 1 2.54 396
1 2 2 0 0 4 1 2 2.54 390
1 2 3 0 0 4 1 3 2.54 380
2 1 1 185 0 4 2 3 2.54 396
2 1 2 196 0 4 2 3 2.54 396
2 1 3 215 0 4 2 3 2.54 396
2 2 1 185 0 5 1 1 1.60 0
2 2 2 196 0 5 1 2 1.60 0
2 2 3 215 0 5 1 3 1.60 0
3 1 1 113 113 5 2 1 1.60 0
3 1 2 120 120 5 2 2 1.60 0
3 1 3 132 132 5 2 3 1.60 0
TABLE 22
Electricity sales for EMEM: Sensitivity Analysis
unit u3. Coal producer m2 is not allowed to produce coal as units u1 and u2 do not
produce electricity in this case. Natural gas producers almost produce 200,000
MCF/day rather than 2000 - 3000 MCF/day due to increase in pipeline capacity
enormously.
Electricity demand
i t CNE-NonE[Megawatts] CNE-NonE(SA pipeline cap)
1 1 302 509
1 2 320 511
1 3 352 513
2 1 302 509
2 2 320 511
2 3 352 513
TABLE 23
Electricity demand for EMEM: Sensitivity Analysis
Table 23 shows the increase in electricity demand after increase in pipeline
capacity of natural gas. Almost 50% of electricity demand is satisfied by unit u4
which is natural gas fired. Flow of natural gas through pipeline l1 is around 400,000
MCF/day and there is no flow through pipeline l2 as it leads to generation unit u5
(unit u5 doesn’t produce electricity as discussed earlier).
The prices of coal and electricity becomes interesting in this sensitive
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analysis. Table 27 compares the shadow price of coal. Price of coal for coal producer
m2 is only 8.34 $/shortton at time t1, which was 41.30 $/shortton. This is because
of increase in use of natural gas for production of electricity. Table 25 shows the
price of electricity, which is much lower at $9.009/MWh for i1, t1, almost one-third
of the price as it was without pipeline capacity expansion ($29.71/MWh for i1, t1).
This is because of increase in elastic demand and excess availability of resources for
production of electricity.
Coal price
v t pcvtCNE($/Shortton) p
c
vtCNE (SA pipeline cap)($/Shortton)
1 1 61.13 52.72
1 2 57.22 52.73
1 3 50.38 52.59
2 1 41.30 8.34
2 2 38.4 8.13
2 3 33.37 7.78
TABLE 24
Coal price for for EMEM: Sensitivity Analysis
Electricity price
i t peitCNE($/MWh) p
e
itCNE(SA pipeline cap)($/MWh)
1 1 29.71 9.009
1 2 27.90 8.882
1 3 24.73 8.659
2 1 29.71 9.009
2 2 27.90 8.882
2 3 24.73 8.659
TABLE 25
Electricity price for EMEM: Sensitivity Analysis
Natural gas price of upstream is also one interesting thing as the production
price increased from $0.019/MCF to almost $1.2/MCF because of increase in
production and relatively less gap between production and available capacity. In
previous model, production was 2,300 MCF/day while available capacity is
100,000000 MCF/day. But, in this model production is almost 2,000,000 MCF/day
with same available capacity. Where as, midstream price of natural gas is nearly
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zero due to enormous amount of available capacity. This resulted in natural gas
downstream price to drop from $4.0/MCF - $5.0/MCF to nearly $1.2/MCF -
$1.3/MCF.
Secondly, we vary coefficients of inverse demand function of electricity. The
present function is P ejt(·) = co − c1deit (co = 60, c1 = 0.1). Initially, co-efficient co is
increased by 40 till co reaches 200 keeping c1 constant. In all the cases, change in
inverse demand function doesn’t affect sales of electricity by generation unit u to
demand node i at time t (suit). Sales of electricity remain exactly the same as in
Table 11. It doesn’t affect the amount of coal produced either. Coal producers m1
and m2 continue to produce 100,000 shortton/t and 120,000 shortton/t in all cases.
Also, same holds for electricity demand deit and can be seen in Table 10. Flow of
natural gas through pipelines l1 and l2 is 2,740 MCF/day and 1,860 MCF/day in all
cases in this analysis.
Since, values of suit, zmt, d
e
it, gnt, flt and qawjkt do not change with change in
coefficient co of inverse demand function, their tables showing values are ignored.
Interesting part of this sensitivity analysis lies in shadow prices of coal (pcvt),
electricity (peit), natural gas pipeline (plt)and natural gas marketer (pgjkt). Inverse
demand function is a function that maps the quantity of output demanded to the
market price for that output. As demand satisfied depends on availability of
resources (coal and natural gas in this case), it remains unchanged. Therefore, the
price of electricity directly depends on coefficient co.
Electricity price peit ($/MWh)
i t co = 60 co = 80 co = 120 co = 160 co = 200
1 1 28.76 48 88 128 168
1 2 26.95 46 86 126 166
1 3 23.78 43 83 123 163
2 1 28.76 48 88 128 168
2 2 26.95 46 86 126 166
2 3 23.78 43 83 123 163
TABLE 26
Electricity price for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand function (co)
Table 26 shows the price of electricity for node i at equilibrium when
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coefficient co of inverse demand function is changed. It can be seen that increase in
co-efficient of co results in increase of electricity price. When observed closely,
electricity price for node i1, time t1, co = 120 is 128 [$/MWh] and for co = 200 is
168 [$/MWh]. This is just an example for one case but similar pattern can be
observed in all the cases. An addition of 40 to coefficient co results in an increase of
40 $/MWh of electricity price and follows a linear relationship. We’d like to
investigate the theoretical aspect of this observation in a future study.
Coal price pcvt ($/Shortton)
v t co = 60 co = 80 co = 120 co = 160 co = 200
1 1 59.07 102 188 274 361
1 2 55.16 98 184 270 357
1 3 48.32 91 177 264 350
2 1 39.78 71 135 198 262
2 2 36.90 68 132 196 259
2 3 21.86 63 127 191 254
TABLE 27
Coal price for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand function (co)
The increase in coefficient co demands for more electricity for the given price.
As mentioned earlier, amount of resources are limited in this model and are not
allowed to produce more electricity. Table 27 shows coal price for region v at
equilibrium. For region v1, time t1, coefficient co = 80, coal price is 102 $/shortton
and for co = 120 it is 188 $/shortton. Increase in positive coefficient results in
increase in coal price due to more demand. Interestingly, coal price also follows a
specific pattern i.e. an increase in 40 to coefficient co results in an increase of
around 86 $/shortton of coal price.
Tables 28 and 29 shows the shadow price for natural gas transportation
pipelines and downstream. Increase in coefficient co increase these prices. For
instance, transportation price of pipeline l1, at time t1 for co = 80 is 6.94 [$/MCF]
and for co = 120 is 12.66 [$/MCF]. Like coal and electricity prices, natural gas
transportation price also follows a pattern with increase in positive coefficient of
inverse demand function. An increase in 40 to coefficient co results in an increase of
around 6 $/MCF. Natural gas production price remains unchanged (0.019 $/MCF)
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Natural gas transportation price plt ($/MCF)
l t co = 60 co = 80 co = 120 co = 160 co = 200
1 1 4.09 6.94 12.66 18.37 24.09
1 2 3.83 6.68 12.4 18.11 24.83
1 3 3.37 6.23 11.95 17.66 23.37
2 1 3.81 6.48 11.81 17.44 22.48
2 2 3.57 6.24 11.57 16.9 22.24
2 3 3.15 5.81 11.15 16.48 21.81
TABLE 28
Natural gas transportation rates for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand
function (co)
because of its huge capacity. Natural gas downstream price is the sum of
transportation price and production price. Table 29 shows that it follows similar
results as in transportation price and adds 0.019 $/MCF for each case.
Ng downstream price pgjt ($/MCF)
j t co = 60 co = 80 co = 120 co = 160 co = 200
1 1 4.1 6.96 12.68 18.39 24.1
1 2 3.85 6.7 12.42 18.13 24.85
1 3 3.39 6.25 11.96 17.68 23.39
2 1 3.83 6.5 11.83 17.16 22.5
2 2 3.59 6.26 11.59 16.92 22.26
2 3 3.17 5.83 11.17 16.5 21.83
TABLE 29
Downstream natural gas prices for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand
function (co)
Next, we vary c1 of inverse demand function of electricity. The original
function is P ejt(·) = co − c1deit (co = 60, c1 = 0.1). Co-efficient c1 is changed keeping
c0 constant. Like in previous analysis, values of suit, zmt, d
e
it, gnt, flt and qawjkt do
not change with change in coefficient c1. Decrease in co-efficient c1 also causes
increase in price because c1 is a negative co-efficient of inverse demand function.
Table 30 shows coal price for region v at equilibrium for different coefficients (c1).
Coal price for region v1, time t1 for c1 = 0.1 is 59.07 $/Shortton and for c1 = 0.09 is
65 $/Shortton.
Table 31 shows electricity price for demand node i. Negative co-efficient c1 is
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Coal price pcvt ($/Shortton)
v t c1 = 0.1 c1 = 0.09 c1 = 0.06 c1 = 0.03
1 1 59.07 65 86 106
1 2 55.16 62 83 105
1 3 48.32 56 79 103
2 1 39.78 44 59 74
2 2 36.90 42 57 73
2 3 21.86 37 54 72
TABLE 30
Coal price for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand function(c1)
Electricity price peit ($/MWh)
i t c1 = 0.1 c1 = 0.09 c1 = 0.06 c1 = 0.03
1 1 28.76 31 41 50
1 2 26.95 30 40 50
1 3 23.78 27 38 49
2 1 28.76 31 41 50
2 2 26.95 30 40 50
2 3 23.78 27 38 49
TABLE 31
Electricity price for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand function(c1)
decreased from 0.1 to 0.03. Electricity price for node i1, time t1, c1 = 0.06 is 41
$/MWh and c1 = 0.03 is 50 $/MWh. Decrease in 0.03 to coefficient c1 results in an
increase of around 9 $/MWh. Tables 32 and 33 show natural gas transportation and
downstream prices. As mentioned previously, due to enormous availability of
natural gas capacity production price remains 0.019 $/MCF in all cases. The main
reason for the increase in shadow price is the increased electricity demand due to
decreased value of c1.
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Ng transportation price plt ($/MCF)
l t c1 = 0.1 c1 = 0.09 c1 = 0.06 c1 = 0.03
1 1 4.09 4.53 5.87 7.23
1 2 3.83 4.3 5.72 7.15
1 3 3.37 3.89 5.44 7.01
2 1 3.81 4.23 5.48 6.75
2 2 3.57 4.01 5.33 6.67
2 3 3.15 3.63 5.08 6.55
TABLE 32
Natural gas transportation rates for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand
function(c1)
Ng downstream price pgjt ($/MCF)
j t c1 = 0.1 c1 = 0.09 c1 = 0.06 c1 = 0.03
1 1 4.1 4.55 5.89 7.23
1 2 3.85 4.32 5.73 7.15
1 3 3.39 3.91 5.46 7.01
2 1 3.83 4.25 5.5 6.75
2 2 3.59 4.03 5.35 6.67
2 3 3.17 3.65 5.103 6.55
TABLE 33
Downstream natural gas prices for EMEM: different coefficients of inverse demand
function(c1)
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Figure 6. Flow of natural gas from producers to electric and NonE sector
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis makes an attempt to explore a way for energy systems that work
more efficiently with each other in an integrated manner. The contribution of the
thesis is two-fold. First, an equilibrium model is developed using individual
optimization problems of players and their market clearing conditions whenever
players interact with each other. Second, the model is converted into an MCP for
numerical testing. Subsequently, we analyze these numerical results for three
models: the model with coal and electricity markets; the model with coal, electricity
and natural gas markets; the model with coal, electricity, natural gas markets along
with non-electric sector.
Particularly, we solve the equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity
problem. The objective is to: 1) create an equilibrium among the players involved in
integrated energy system which efficiently governs supply and demand 2) help in
decision making and evaluation for a potential energy policy.
Numerical results show that the shadow price of coal, electricity and natural
gas perfectly align with those prices reported by EIA [13] and makes model valid for
practical use in decision making. The equilibrium model is driven in the direction of
maximization of electricity consumers surplus. We analyze the electricity demand
and shadow prices for all the three models. It shows that price changes according to
demand and is inversely proportional to it. For example, at demand node i1 and
time t1 the elastic demand for electricity is 298 Megawatts when only considering
coal as the generation source and the corresponding shadow price of electricity is
$30/MWh. When considering both coal and natural gas as generation sources (but
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without natural gas’ non-electric usage) the elastic demand for electricity is 311.69
Megawatts and corresponding shadow price of electricity is $28.70/MWh. This
shows that more electricity is produced when natural gas is made available cause
the shadow price of the electricity to drop. It exactly holds true for coal and natural
gas markets as well. When non-electric sector is added to the model, the shadow
prices slightly increase due to the decrease in production of the electricity (part of
the natural gas is used by the non-electric sector) but is less than the shadow price
with model that has only the coal and electricity markets. For a cleaner energy
policy, natural gas is more environmental friendly than coal. So, this model helps
decision makers to decide the quantities of coal and natural gas to be used in their
energy system based on shadow prices (output) of the developed EMEM model.
5.2 Future Research
There are several future research directions. First, we would like to
investigate the theoretical aspect of sensitivity analysis performed on EMEM model
by changing various parameters like natural gas pipeline capacity, inverse demand
function of electricity, time horizons and the efficiency of generations units in a
future study. Second, we would like to extend the EMEM model to imperfect
competition environment where electricity generators play Nash-Cournot games
among each other, but are price takers of natural gas and coal delivered prices.
Third, we would like to discover if coal mine owners have the market power.
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